Supreme Court case law

High treason: classification and procedural safeguards

Unofficial English translation of the Supreme Court’s official review

Державна зрада: кваліфікація та процесуальні гарантії. ККС ВС, 12.02.2026, 497/2392/22.

About this publication · Bureau introduction

The Bureau presents the decision of 12.02.2026 in case No. 497/2392/22: high treason: classification and procedural safeguards.

Below is a complete unofficial English translation of all corresponding passages of the Criminal Cassation Court’s official review for February 2026. The review covers decisions entered in the Unified State Register of Court Decisions during that month. The title and introduction were prepared by the Bureau. CC means the Criminal Code of Ukraine; CPC means the Criminal Procedure Code of Ukraine.

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Facts of the case: a Ukrainian citizen systematically sent representatives of the Russian Federation information about the location of military facilities, equipment and personnel of Armed Forces of Ukraine units using Telegram.

Positions of the courts of first instance and appeal: the lower courts found the accused guilty and convicted him under Article 111 § 2 CC.

In his cassation appeal, defence counsel argued that the accused’s conduct had been incorrectly classified under Article 111 § 2 CC because the case file contained no admissible evidence that he had communicated with a representative of a foreign state, and the local court’s finding to that effect was unsupported. In counsel’s view, the conduct should have been classified under Article 114-2 § 2 CC.

Position of the Criminal Cassation Court: the decisions of the lower courts were upheld.

Reasoning of the Criminal Cassation Court: the panel noted that these proceedings concerned the systematic transmission of information sensitive to the state about the location of military facilities, equipment and personnel. This had rightly been assessed as assisting a foreign state, foreign organisation or their representatives in conducting subversive activities against Ukraine, that is, high treason.

The local court established that the convicted person had not merely transmitted isolated facts or photographs, but had regularly exchanged detailed geographical coordinates, images of facilities on Google Maps and information about Armed Forces of Ukraine equipment. The expert report clearly established that the relevant messages had been deleted from the accused’s phone and subsequently recovered. This was therefore not a one-off exchange, but the systematic transmission during martial law of information capable of harming Ukraine’s sovereignty, territorial integrity and inviolability, defence capability, and state, economic and information security.

In those circumstances, the panel considered these facts sufficient to conclude that the convicted person’s intent went far beyond a one-off transmission of information to a representative of an enemy state. It demonstrated a conscious identification of his objectives with that representative’s objectives and a desire to engage in active subversive activity. His conduct could therefore be classified as high treason under Article 111 § 2 CC and did not require classification under Article 114-2 § 2 CC.

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Positions of the courts of first instance and appeal: the lower courts found the accused guilty and convicted him under Article 111 § 2 CC.

In his cassation appeal, defence counsel alleges breaches of Articles 177, 183 and 194 CPC during both the pre-trial investigation and the lower courts’ consideration of the selection and extension of the preventive measure.

Position of the Criminal Cassation Court: the decisions of the lower courts were upheld.

Reasoning of the Criminal Cassation Court: the panel emphasised that the cassation court does not reconsider the selection or extension of a preventive measure, but assesses whether possible violations substantially restricted the defence’s rights and affected the lawfulness and soundness of the final judicial decision—the judgment.

The case file shows that, when considering continued detention, the courts took account of the particularly serious nature of the alleged crime, the nature of the charge as an offence against the foundations of national security, the risk of absconding from the court and the risk of continuing unlawful activity. The reasons in the judicial decisions were not confined to a formal citation of the law.

Under Article 176 § 6 CPC, in the version in force at the time of consideration, detention is applied during martial law to persons accused of offences including those under Article 111 CC.

The legislature thus established a special regime for the application of preventive measures in view of the heightened danger to society posed by such acts under martial law.

Here, the proceedings concerned high treason during martial law; the courts assessed specific risks, and detention was not arbitrary. Even assuming hypothetical shortcomings in the reasons for certain interlocutory orders, the defence did not demonstrate that they called into question the fairness of the proceedings as a whole.

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Positions of the courts of first instance and appeal: the lower courts found the accused guilty and convicted him under Article 111 § 2 CC.

In his cassation appeal, defence counsel argues that his client was immediately under arrest and in handcuffs, so counsel’s participation was mandatory and, in his view, the search results were inadmissible evidence.

Position of the Criminal Cassation Court: the decisions of the lower courts were upheld.

Reasoning of the Criminal Cassation Court: the panel noted that, according to the record of arrest of a person suspected of a crime, the accused was actually arrested at 09:29 on 12 August 2022 during the search of the apartment.

An arrest under Articles 207 or 208 CPC is, by definition, an unexpected event for its participants. Since the law authorises law-enforcement bodies, under certain conditions, to make an arrest without prior judicial authorisation, the legislature recognises the unpredictability of the circumstances giving rise to such an arrest. Arrest without defence counsel’s participation cannot therefore be regarded as a violation of the right to legal assistance.

Accordingly, the fact that the search began at the same time as the arrest did not make counsel’s participation mandatory, because the accused was arrested specifically to prevent him from leaving the place of the investigative action. He was not questioned during the search; only the investigative action—the search—was carried out.

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Positions of the courts of first instance and appeal: the lower courts found the accused guilty and convicted him under Article 111 § 2 CC.

In his cassation appeal, defence counsel argues that conducting the search without counsel violated the accused’s right to a defence.

Position of the Criminal Cassation Court: the decisions of the lower courts were upheld.

Reasoning of the Criminal Cassation Court: the CPC contains no provision requiring defence counsel to participate in a search, including in criminal proceedings in which counsel’s participation is mandatory under Articles 49 and 52 CPC. In other words, even mandatory representation in criminal proceedings under the CPC does not require counsel’s participation in every investigative action without exception.

As the local court established, the convicted person’s home was searched under the relevant investigating judge’s order, in the presence of the convicted person and attesting witnesses. The investigative action was technically recorded; the video recording was added to the case file and played at the hearing.

The apartment search in these proceedings was therefore conducted in accordance with the applicable criminal procedure law. The investigative actions were performed in a procedural manner consistent with the CPC, with the relevant safeguards observed and a record drawn up describing in detail the conditions and results of the investigative action.

The case file also shows that the convicted person made no statements or objections during the search, including about counsel’s mandatory participation. This is confirmed by the search record and the video recording.

The absence of defence counsel during the apartment search therefore cannot be regarded as a violation of the convicted person’s right to a defence.

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Positions of the courts of first instance and appeal: the lower courts found the accused guilty and convicted him under Article 111 § 2 CC.

In his cassation appeal, defence counsel alleges a breach of Article 291 § 2 CPC because the personal particulars state the accused’s registered address although the CPC does not provide for this, while postal codes are omitted from both the registered and actual residential addresses; the indictment states the investigator’s special rank contrary to the CPC, but does not similarly state the prosecutor’s class rank; the pages of the register annexed to the indictment are not numbered; the register describes the materials as those of a special pre-trial investigation, although an ordinary pre-trial investigation was conducted; and the charge is insufficiently specific, violating the accused’s right to a defence.

Position of the Criminal Cassation Court: the decisions of the lower courts were upheld.

Reasoning of the Criminal Cassation Court: the panel noted that, in alleging a breach of Article 291 CPC because the register was not numbered and was described as a register of materials of special proceedings when it was not, defence counsel failed to explain how these formal deficiencies prevented or could have prevented the court from reaching a lawful and reasoned decision.

The panel stated that such formal discrepancies in the register—stating the accused’s registered address in the personal particulars, missing postal codes and numbering in addresses, an incorrect description of the type of materials, and stating the investigator’s rank but not the prosecutor’s rank—do not affect the lawfulness and soundness of the judicial decisions. Such matters are also not matters for challenge before the cassation court.

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Positions of the courts of first instance and appeal: the lower courts found the accused guilty and convicted him under Article 111 § 2 CC.

In his cassation appeal, defence counsel alleges a violation of the right to trial by jury.

Position of the Criminal Cassation Court: the decisions of the lower courts were upheld.

Reasoning of the Criminal Cassation Court: the panel noted that under Article 31 § 3 CPC, first-instance criminal proceedings concerning offences punishable by life imprisonment are heard by a panel of three judges or, at the accused’s request, by a jury court comprising two judges and three jurors. Proceedings against several accused are heard by a jury court in respect of all of them if at least one requests such a trial.

The panel also took into account that the indictment reached the first-instance court on 23 November 2022, when martial law had already been introduced in Ukraine by Presidential Decree No. 64/2022 of 24 February 2022 and subsequently extended repeatedly.

Law No. 2201-IX of 14 April 2022, On Amending the Criminal Procedure Code of Ukraine to Improve the Procedure for Conducting Criminal Proceedings under Martial Law, recast Article 615 CPC, which governs the special regime for criminal proceedings under martial law.

Article 615 § 10 CPC, as amended by that Law, provides that first-instance proceedings concerning offences punishable by life imprisonment are heard by a panel of three judges, except where a court’s composition including jurors had been determined before the introduction of martial law and the entry into force of that paragraph.

This provision entered into force on 1 May 2022, before the indictment against the accused reached the court on 23 November 2022.

The defence does not dispute that, at the preparatory hearing, the first-instance court explained to all participants that this statutory provision, effective from 1 May 2022, precluded trial by jury.

In view of the above, the panel stated that the local court had correctly applied Article 615 CPC in the version introduced by Law No. 2201-IX of 14 April 2022 and had heard the criminal proceedings as a panel of three judges.

Decision details and sources

The review contains the principal conclusions. Consult the full judicial decision in the Unified State Register of Court Decisions for a complete understanding of the legal position. The decision link and details are reproduced from the official review.

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